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A propos Brexit: on the breaking up of integration
areas – an NEG analysis
Pasquale Commendatore a, Ingrid Kubin b and Iryna Sushko c
ABSTRACT
Inspired by Brexit, the paper explores the effects of splitting an integration area or ‘Union’ on trade patterns
and the spatial distribution of industry. A linear three-region New Economic Geography (NEG) model is
developed and two possible situations before separation are considered: agglomeration and dispersion. By
analogy with the Brexit options, soft and hard separation scenarios are considered. Firms in the leaving
region may move to the larger Union market, even on the periphery, relocation substituting trade; or ﬁrms
in the Union may move in the more isolated leaving region, escaping from competition. The paper also
analyses deeper Union integration following separation. Instances of multistability and complex dynamics
are found.
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INTRODUCTION
The forming of integration areas and its problems have always been at the centre of international
economics. The breaking up of integration areas is far less investigated. However, with the immi-
nent Brexit, it is precisely this breaking up and its implications that moves into the focus of
interest.
Integration – not only, but in particular within the European Union (EU) – always encom-
passes trade as well as factor movements. This interrelationship between trade and factor move-
ments – while neglected in the traditional international trade models – is at the core of the New
Economic Geography (NEG), a paradigm pioneered by Krugman in the early 1990s (Krugman,
1991). In the following, we present an NEG analysis of the breaking up of an integration area,
inspired by the Brexit.
Which stylized facts do we take on board?
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. The EU is not a homogeneous integration area, but shows marked regional inequality (e.g.,
Eurostat, 2019a, reports that in 2017 regional gross domestic product (GDP) per capita,
expressed in terms of purchasing power standards (PPS), in the richest NUTS-2 region is
20 times higher than in the poorest NUTS-2 region).1
. With the UK, a core region is leaving the EU (Eurostat, 2019a, reports that the NUTS-1
region Greater London was one of the richest regions and enjoyed in 2017 a regional GDP
per capita, expressed in terms of PPS, that was 187% of the EU average).
. Different hard and soft Brexit options are possible.
. Brexit is expected to have substantial impacts not only on trade patterns but also on factor
movements, in particular on the location of ﬁrms.
. As a reaction to Brexit, the EU may try to deepen integration of the remaining regions (as
Emmanuel Macron suggested in a widely noted speech; Macron, 2017).
In models of the NEG, the breaking up of an integration area is represented by an increase in
trade costs. These models combine a trade model à la Krugman (1980) based upon monopolistic
competition, trade costs and productive factors that choose location according to expected factor
rewards. Access to a larger home market and the possibility to reach the other markets with low
trade costs translates into higher factor rewards, which attracts ﬁrms to this particular location to
serve the local as well as the international market. The market access effect fosters agglomeration
of industry in few regions. It is mitigated by a competition effect: more ﬁrms in a location reduce
factor rewards. An increase in trade costs will change the access to international markets and thus
trade patterns; at the same time, the attractiveness of a region for industry location changes. NEG
models focus on the long-run effects of a change in trade costs simultaneously on industry location
and trade patterns.
Since Krugman’s seminal contribution (Krugman, 1991), a plethora of NEG models emerged
differing in particular on the productive factor that is considered as internationally mobile and the
speciﬁcation of the demand function. At the core of the present study (which is inspired by the EU
with its notorious low mobility of unqualiﬁed labour) is the mobility of high-qualiﬁed labour and
capital; accordingly, we choose a footloose entrepreneur (FE) model. In addition, we use an FE
model with a linear (instead of an isoelastic) demand function. In this model version, ‘zero
trade’ situations are possible; they therefore allow one to shed a very clear light on changes in
trade patterns.
Finally, we view the EU not as a homogenous integrated area, but rather as split between cen-
tral and peripheral regions (indeed, with the UK leaving, part of the centre leaves the EU); and we
suspect that these core–periphery (CP) patterns are not entirely exogenous, but have at least been
reinforced by endogenous agglomeration processes (which are prominent in an NEG perspective).
Therefore, we need a model with (at least) three regions.
Our model extends the linear NEG model put forward by Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse
(2002) (more speciﬁcally, the FE version presented by Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano, &
Robert-Nicoud, 2003), in two directions: (1) as mentioned, we increase the number of regions
considered from two to three; and (2) following Behrens (2004, 2005), we study explicitly the
number and direction of trade links between regions and their dependence upon the degree of
trade integration.
When only two regions are considered, the possible number of trade patterns are only four (no
trade, one-way trade from the ﬁrst to the second region, one-way trade from the second to the ﬁrst
region, bilateral trade). By increasing the number of regions, the possible number of trade patterns
changes substantially (even if the number of potential trade links between each pair of regions is
still the same).
The speciﬁc trade pattern is determined by the size of trade costs and by the distribution of
ﬁrms across the economy. In general, the market of one region is less accessible for ﬁrms of a
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second region, if the degree of local competition, determined by the number of home ﬁrms or of
ﬁrms from a third region that have already penetrated that market (third-region effect), is higher.
The existence or absence of one (or more) trade links alters substantially the attractiveness of a
region and the possible long-run outcomes. Thus, in this model the evolution of the spatial dis-
tribution of ﬁrms and of trade patterns are deeply interrelated; and the long-run distribution of
ﬁrms and the trade network structure are determined simultaneously.
In the literature, there are a few linear three-region NEG models that mostly assume sym-
metric trade costs: Castro, Correia-da-Silva, and Mossay (2012) and Gaspar, Castro, and Cor-
reia-da-Silva (2019) consider, respectively, the standard CP model and the FE model with
isoelastic demand functions extended to the case of several regions larger than two, which are
equally spaced along a circle. Tabuchi, Thisse, and Zeng (2005) consider an n-region economy
where in each region a city emerges, that is, it is characterized by a positive share of the mobile
factor (workers). The model is quite different from ours, assuming the existence of a third
good (land or housing) and commuting costs. Commuting costs and land rents impact on
urban costs, which are a function of the share of the mobile factor. The demand functions for
the manufactured goods are linear (derived from a quadratic sub-utility function, as in Ottaviano
et al., 2002), but trade costs are sufﬁciently low so that cities always trade with each other (i.e., the
trade network is always full). Distance between the regions is equal since they are positioned on a
circle and trade involves going through its centre.
Ago, Isono, and Tabuchi (2003, 2006) consider a three-region CP linear model where the
regions are distributed and equally spaced along a line. They study the effect on industry location
and trade patterns formation of integration as the distance between the central region and the two
regions at the extremes becomes closer as the unique trade cost parameter is reduced.
Commendatore, Kubin, and Sushko (2018a, 2018b) consider a three-region FE linear model
and study three simpliﬁed cases: in the ﬁrst case, trade costs are so high that none of the regions is
trading, no trade network structure can emerge; in the second case, trade costs between two
regions are reduced allowing for trade between them, but the third region is still autarkic. Only
four possible trade network conﬁgurations can emerge which are very simple. Finally, in the
third case, two of the regions are sufﬁciently integrated that they are always engaged in bilateral
trade; and trade costs between one of these regions and the third region is reduced. Also in
this case only four trade network conﬁgurations are possible (differentiated by the number and
direction of trade links involving the third region and the closest region belonging to the inte-
grated area). Behrens (2011) is quite different since the author assumes a more limited factor
mobility.
The present paper differs from the ones just reviewed in the following dimensions:
. We add more asymmetry by assuming a different and more general geography of trade
barriers.2
. We allow for a much larger set of possible trade network structures.
. The focus is on trade disintegration (and not trade integration).
In this paper, we study the effects of an increase of the trade distance between one of the
regions and the other two (more asymmetric distances and breaking of an integration area). In
this sense the paper complements the previously mentioned studies.
Multiregional NEGmodels are notoriously complex to analyse (for a comprehensive review on
multiregional NEG modelling, see Commendatore, Filoso, Kubin, & Grafeneder-Weissteiner,
2015; and also Gaspar, 2018). Many studies therefore recur to simulations. Recently, Ikeda
and co-authors (e.g., Ikeda, Akamatsu, & Kono, 2012, 2017, 2018) provided some remarkable
studies of multiregional geographical models in which the economies are spatially organized on
a ‘racetrack’ or on a hexagonal lattice. They use group theoretic bifurcation theory in order to
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obtain analytical results. However, these studies are also complemented by numerical simulations
(see also Barbero & Zofío, 2016). In the present paper, we primarily present simulation results
complemented by intuitive explanations of the underlying economic forces.
We show that the consequences of disintegration depends upon the initial state of the inte-
gration area or ‘Union’. Accordingly, we compare two different initial states that are quintessential
in an NEG perspective and that depend upon the speciﬁc interplay between local market size,
local competition and trade costs. In a ﬁrst scenario, the three-region economy is well integrated
with small local market sizes and low trade costs; NEG models typically predict agglomeration of
economic activity. In a second scenario, local market sizes are bigger and NEG models suggest an
equal distribution of economic activity between the three regions. Accordingly, we choose two
different values for the local market size. (Note that we deliberately abstract for exogenous differ-
ences in market size, but assume three symmetric regions; agglomerative patterns are endogen-
ously produced by NEG forces.)
For both scenarios, we study a soft versus a hard disintegration involving different increases in
trade costs between the leaving region and the regions remaining in the Union. In addition, we
study the effects of a deeper integration between the regions remaining in the Union (as a reaction
to the breaking up). The analysis reveals a highly complex bifurcation sequence involving many
instances of coexisting long-run stationary equilibria (with complicated basins of attraction)
and of cyclical and complex dynamics. Among our results, we ﬁnd the following of particular
interest:
. The leaving region may lose ﬁrms to the regions remaining in the Union; the ﬁrms in the
Union (continue to) export, while the ﬁrms remaining in the leaving region do not (any
more) – thus, ﬁrm relocation acts as substitute for trade.
. Most remarkably, the exit of one core region may induce ﬁrm relocation also to a peripheral
region within the Union (which did not host industry before the breakup).
. A deepening of the integration between the remaining regions may lead to a weakening of the
trade links between the Union and the leaving region; and it may put peripheral regions in
danger to lose again their industry.
. In some instances, intense competition within the Union may lead to the opposite result with
ﬁrms moving to the leaving region to escape the competitive pressure.3
The paper is structured as follows. The next section states the main assumptions of the model
on which the analysis is based. The third section considers the short-run equilibrium, paying par-
ticular attention to the different possible trade structures. The fourth section studies the long-run
implications of the model and analyses the various exiting options. The ﬁfth section concludes.
MAIN ASSUMPTIONS
The economy is composed of three regions, labelled Rr with r = 1, 2, 3; two sectors: agriculture
(the A sector) and manufacturing or industry (the M sector); two types of agents: workers (L,
endowed with unskilled labour) and entrepreneurs (E, endowed with human capital). Workers
are mobile across sectors but immobile across regions; entrepreneurs migrate across regions but
are speciﬁc to manufacturing. The three regions share the same technology and consumer’s pre-
ferences and have the same endowment of labour, L1 = L2 = L3 = L/3. On purpose, we are
abstracting from the fact that integration areas mostly involve regions with quite different popu-
lation sizes. In this respect, the present study only represents a ﬁrst attempt to shed a light on the
issue of splitting of integration areas and we leave to further research the study of regions with
asymmetric sizes.
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The A sector is perfectly competitive, constant returns prevail and production involves one unit
of labour to produce one unit of the homogeneous agricultural good. In the monopolistically com-
petitiveM sector, the N varieties of a differentiated commodity are produced by using one entre-
preneur as a ﬁxed component. Following Ottaviano et al. (2002) and Behrens (2004, 2005), we
assume that there is not a variable input requirement. This will not alter substantially the analysis.
There are no economies of scope, thus, due to increasing returns, each ﬁrm produces only a variety.
Following from the assumption that one entrepreneur is required to activate the production of a
variety, the total number of varieties is equal to the total number of entrepreneurs, E = N . Denot-
ing by lr the share of entrepreneurs located in Rr , the number of varieties produced in this region
corresponds to Nr = lrN = lrE.
The representative consumer’s (unskilled worker or entrepreneur) preferences are quasi-linear
(Ottaviano et al., 2002), composed of a quadratic sub-utility deﬁning the choice across the N var-















where ci is the consumption of the M variety i; and CA is the consumption of the A good. The
parameters are interpreted as follows: a . 0 is the intensity of preferences over the M varieties;
d . 0 is the degree of substitutability across those varieties and the difference b− d measures
the taste for variety; and b . d . 0.4 The budget constraint is:
∑i=1
N
pici + pACA = y + pACA , (2)
where pi is the price of variety i; pA the price of the agricultural good; y is the consumer’s income;
and CA is her endowment of the agricultural good, sufﬁciently large to allow for positive consump-
tion in equilibrium.
The cost of trading varieties of theM good between regions, say from Rr to Rs (or in the oppo-
site direction from Rs toRr) is Trs( = Tsr); with Trs . 0 for r = s, Trr = 0 and r, s = 1, 2, 3.
Trade costs separate the regions introducing the spatial dimension into the economy. Different
conﬁgurations are possible, for present purposes we assume that the trade distance between R1
and R3 and R2 and R3 is the same, whereas the distance between R1 and R2 could be shorter:
T13 = T23 = TEX ≥ T12 = TU . Our structure is quite different from that assumed by Ago
et al. (2003, 2006) where the three regions are equally spaced along a line and one of the regions
has a central position. In fact, we assume an even more asymmetric structure where the three
regions are positioned on the vertices of an isosceles and acute-angled triangle. This implies
that centrality is shared between two regions (R1 and R2) and the third region (R3) is more per-
ipheral (except in the special case TEX = TU ). This set-up describes a three-region economy
where R1 and R2 are part of a more integrated area, whereas R3 could be less integrated with
the rest of the economy. Thus, we provide a stylized set-up that can be used to describe the con-
sequences of one of the region’s (the ‘exiting region’ R3) choice to leave the integration area (the
‘Union’). We ﬁrst consider the effects of an increase in TEX starting from the initial state
TEX = TU . We deﬁne it as the ﬁrst phase of the breaking up of the integration area. We then
consider the effects of a reduction of TU when TEX . TU , in order to study the consequences
of a second phase following the exit of R3 from the Union, involving a deeper integration between
the two remaining regions R1 and R2.
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SHORT-RUN EQUILIBRIUM
In a short-run equilibrium the distribution of entrepreneurs across the regions is given. All mar-
kets are in equilibrium. We choose the A good as the numeraire. From perfect competition in the
A sector, it follows pA = w = 1, wherew is the wage rate. To determine the short-run equilibrium
solutions related to the M sector, we proceed as follows. Maximizing the utility (1) subject to the
constraint (2), we obtain the ﬁrst order conditions for i = 1, . . . , N :
∂U
∂ci
= pi ⇔ ∂U
∂ci
− pi = a− (b− d)ci − d
∑i=1
N
ci − pi = 0,
from which pi = a− (b− d)ci − dSNi=1ci . Solving for ci, we obtain the individual linear demand
function for each variety i:
ci = max [0, a − (b+ cN )pi + cP],
where P = SNi=1pi is the price index; a = (a/(N − 1)d+ b), b = (1/(N − 1)d+ b) and
c = (d/(b− d)[(N − 1)d+ b]). Moreover, we deﬁne p˜i = (a + cP/b+ cN ) the cut-off price
only below which the demand for variety i is positive: ci . 0 for pi , p˜i.
The consumer’s demand originating from Rs (s = 1, 2, 3) for a M good produced in Rr
(r = 1, 2, 3), dropping the subscript i because of symmetric ﬁrm behaviour (a typical assumption
of NEG models), is: crs = max [0, a − (b+ cN )prs + cPs], where prs is the price of aM good pro-








is the price index in Rs. As before crs . 0 if and only if prs , p˜s = (a + cPs/b+ cN ). Taking into
account that workers are equally spread across the regions, L1 = L2 = L3 = L/3, with segmented




( prs − Trs)qrs L3 + lsE
( )
. (4)
where qrs is the quantity produced by a ﬁrm located in region Rr and brought to the market in
region Rs. In a short-run equilibrium, demand is equal to supply in each segmented market
(labelled r, s = 1, 2, 3): crs = qrs. Recalling that N = E and that ﬁrms consider the price index
as given, proﬁt maximization implies:
prs =




( p˜s + Trs) if Trs , p˜s
p˜s if Trs ≥ p˜s
⎧⎨⎩ , (5)
which is the price that a ﬁrm located in Rr quotes in the market s, with r, s = 1, 2, 3 and
p˜s = (a + cPs/b+ cE). Moreover, we assume prr . 0.
Using the demand function and the price solutions, we can write:
qrs = (b+ cE)( prs − Trs) if Trs , p˜s0 if Trs ≥ p˜s
{
, (6)
which is the quantity that a ﬁrm located in Rr sells in Rs, with r, s = 1, 2, 3. According to (5) and
(6), if a ﬁrm located in Rr quotes in the market of Rs a price larger or equal than the cut-off price p˜s
(i.e., a price which is above the maximum reservation price consumers living in Rs are prepared to
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pay for a positive quantity of a M variety), the export from Rr to Rs is zero. The boundary con-
ditions for trade, as reported in these expressions, are crucial to determine the patterns of trade
between the regions, as we shall see in the analysis below.
The indirect utility for an r entrepreneur is:
Vr = Sr + pr + CA , (7)












and where the operating proﬁt pr also represents the income of an r entrepreneur.
Trade network structures
From the above discussion, the occurrence of trade between regions depends on trade costs. Above
a threshold the price quoted by foreign ﬁrms is too high and exports cannot take place. It follows
that the trade network structure is strongly affected by trade costs and by the spatial distribution of
industry. In this subsection, we make explicit the conditions for trade between the three regions
and verify that not all network structures are possible given the chosen trade costs conﬁguration
(T13 = T23 = TEX ≥ T12 = TU ).
Considering the three regions, R1, R2 and R3, the existence of a trade link from one of them,
labelled Rr , to a second one, labelled Rs, depends on trade costs and on competition in the local
market originating both from local and foreign ﬁrms. The latter is affected by the existence or
absence of another link from the third region, labelled Rk, to Rs, with r, s, k = 1, 2, 3 and
r = s= k. If such a link is absent, r ﬁrms (i.e., those located in Rr) only face competition
from the local s ﬁrms (i.e., those located in Rs); instead, if it is present, r ﬁrms face competition
also from k ﬁrms (i.e., those located in Rk) exporting to Rs. In general (see expressions (5) and (6)),
the condition for trade (respectively no trade) from Rr to Rs is:
Trs , ( ≥ ) p˜s = 2pss.
When trade costs are too high for a link from Rk to Rs (Tsk ≥ 2pss), the condition for trade (no
trade) from Rr to Rs becomes:
Trs , ( ≥ ) 2a2b+ clsE or ls , ( ≥ )
2(a − bTrs)
cETrs
for r, s = 1, 2 and k = 3. (9)
Moreover, since TEX ≥ TU , for all other r, s and k a link from Rr to Rs cannot occur. When
such a link does not exist the price quoted by s ﬁrms in the local market is:
pss = a2b+ clsE .
Instead, when it exists, the local price in Rs is:
pss = a + (Trs/2)clrE2b+ c(lr + ls)E .
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When trade costs allow for a link from Rk to Rs (Tsk , 2pss), the condition for trade (no trade)
from Rr to Rs becomes:
Trs , ( ≥ ) 2a + cElkTsk2b+ c(ls + lk)E or
ls , ( ≥ ) 2(a − bTrs)cETrs +
Tsk − Trs
Trs
lk for r = 3 and s, k = 1, 2.
(10)
Moreover, since TEX ≥ TU , for all other r, s and k a link from Rr to Rs always occur. When such a
link does not exist the price ﬁxed locally by s ﬁrms is:
pss = a + (Tsk/2)clkE2b+ c(ls + lk)E .
Instead, when it exists, the local price in Rs is:
pss = a + ((Trs/2)lr + (Tsk/2)lk)cE2b+ cE .
From (10), it follows that the condition for trade (no trade) fromRr andRs is less (more) stringent,
the smaller are ls, lk (therefore, the larger is lr) and Trs and the larger is Tsk. That is, trade (no
trade) from Rr to Rs is more (less) likely the less competitive is the market in Rs (where now the
degree of competition is also determined by the number of k ﬁrms selling in that market), the clo-
ser are regions Rr and Rs and the farther away are regions Rs and Rk.
Combining conditions (9) and (10) (as shown in Commendatore, Kubin, & Sushko, 2018c),
the possible trade network structures (NS) are numbered 18 (Figure 1), grouped into 10 types
(which are isomorphic) and named according to the terminology of social network analysis
(SNA).5
According to Figure 1, when the network structure NS1 (empty graph, in the terminology of
SNA) prevails, there are zero trade links (full autarky case); there is only one trade link in the two
network structures NS2 (single edge) (NS21, NS22): one-way (or unilateral) trade from Rr to Rs,
where r, s = 1, 2 and r = s; in the network structure NS3 (mutual edge), there are two trade links
corresponding to two-way (or bilateral) trade between R1 and R2; when one of the three network
Figure 1. Trade network structures.
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structures NS4 (in star) (NS41, NS42, NS43) prevails, there are two links involving all three
regions: one-way trade from Rr to Rs and from Rk to Rs, where r, s, k = 1, 2, 3 and
r = s= k; in the two network structures NS5 (mutual edge + in) (NS51, NS52) there are
three links: two-way trade between Rr and Rs and one-way trade from Rk to Rr , where
r, s = 1, 2, k = 3 and r = s; we have three links also in the two networks structures NS6 (tran-
sitive) (NS61,NS62): one-way trade fromRr toRs,Rr to Rk andRs toRk, where r, s = 1, 2, k = 3
and r = s; there are four trade links when one of the three network structuresNS7 (mutual edge +
double in) (NS71, NS72, NS73) prevails: one-way trade from Rr to Rs and from Rr to Rk and
bilateral trade between Rs and Rk, where r, s, k = 1, 2, 3 and r = s= k; also four links exist
in the network structure NS8 (mutual edge + double out): two-way trade between R1 and R2,
one-way trade from R1 to R3 and from R2 to R3; ﬁve links characterize the two network structures
NS9 (almost complete graph) (NS91,NS92): two-way trade between Rr andRs andRs andRk and
one-way trade from Rr to Rk, where r, s = 1, 2, k = 3 and r = s; ﬁnally, when the network struc-
ture NS10 (complete graph) prevails, all regions are engaged in mutual trade.
Note that in the special case TU = TE , only trade network structures symmetric with respect to
all three regions (i.e., with a symmetric number of links or with several isomorphic cases equal to
three) can exist. These structures are only eight, grouped into four isomorphic cases (NS1, NS41,
NS42, NS43, NS71, NS72, NS73, NS10).
Short-run solutions
To each trade network conﬁguration – which depends on trade costs and the spatial distri-
bution of entrepreneurs – corresponds a different set of short-run solutions. We cannot pre-
sent here the whole set of solutions (but see Commendatore et al., 2018c). Figure 2 presents
examples of possible combinations of trade costs giving rise to different trade network con-
ﬁgurations. Here the combinations of l1 and l2 (after taking into account that
l3 = 1− l1 − l2) that allow for a speciﬁc network conﬁguration are represented by areas of
the same colour. The lines A1, A2 and C correspond to the conditions in (9), that is, there
is not an incoming trade link from a third region affecting the existence of a link between
two regions; and the lines B1 and B2 correspond to the conditions in (10), that is, such an
incoming link exists (however, notice that when TU = TEX , the two sets of conditions are
identical). The lines are given as:
A1:{(l1, l2):l1 = l˜}; A2:{(l1, l2):l2 = l˜};
B1:{(l1, l2):l1 = l− ul2}; B2:{(l1, l2):l2 = l− ul1};
C:{(l1, l2):l1 = 1− l− l2};
(11)
Figure 2. Examples of possible conﬁgurations of trade costs giving rise to different trade network con-
ﬁgurations. Here a = b = c = 1/3, E = 10 and TU = TEX = 0.325 in (a); TU = 0.325 and TEX = 0.37 in
(b); TU = 0.325 and TEX = 0.45 in (c); and TU = 0.25 and TEX = 0.45 in (d).
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where:
l = 2(a − bTEX )
cETEX
, l˜ = 2(a − bTU )
cETU
and u = TEX − TU
TEX
.
The lines A1 and A2 only involve R1 and R2; instead, the lines B1, B2 and C also involve R3.
Moreover, trade is allowed (not allowed) on the left (right) of A1 and B1, below (above) A2 and B2
and above (below) C.6 Therefore, the crossing of these borders determine changes in the trade
network structure.
We now look more in detail Figure 2, where the different panels involve different trade costs
combinations and show the corresponding trade network conﬁgurations (a number x in an area
indicates the trade network structure NSx). These trade costs combinations are chosen in order
that some trade always occur. In Figure 2(a), TU = TEX , only symmetric trade network struc-
tures exist (NS4, NS7 and NS10). By increasing TEX , a larger variety of trade network structures
become possible (NS3, NS4, NS5, NS6, NS7, NS8 and NS9), which also involve more asym-
metric structures, that is, NS5, NS6 and NS8 (notice, however, that symmetry between regions
R1 and R2 is kept). Given the longer distance between the Union and the exiting region, NS10
cannot occur anymore substituted by less connected trade network structures (NS3, NS8 and
NS9). Similarly, the areas corresponding to trade networks NS7 shrunk, replaced by the less
connected network structures NS5 and NS6. By increasing further TEX , as in Figure 2(c),
this pattern – less connected network structures substituting more connected ones – is con-
ﬁrmed as the NS7 and NS8 areas shrink and theNS6 and NS3 areas expand. This is also empha-
sized by the emergence of the NS2 areas that replace points belonging to NS4, NS6 and NS7
areas.7 Finally, Figure 2(d) considers a strong reduction of TU keeping TEX , as in Figure 2
(c). We notice that the NS3 and NS8 areas expand substantially, a consequence of the closer
distance between R1 and R2; and that there is only one NS7 area corresponding to the case
of bilateral trade between R1 and R2 and one-way trade from R3 to R1 and from R3 to R2
(NS73), the other two replaced by points belonging to NS6 areas (i.e., by NS61 or NS621,
with the loss of a trade link from R3 to R1 or from R3 to R2).
Finally, note that the borders and vertices of the triangles in Figure 2 represent special cases.
On each border ﬁrms are located in only two regions, whereas the third region is empty, and on a
vertex (the crossing of two borders) all industry is agglomerated in one region. Therefore, some of
the outward links (involving exporting ﬁrms) that may occur in a neighbourhood of a point on a
border or of a vertex (where all the industry shares are positive) are necessarily absent in those
points without industry.
DYNAMICS
In the long run, entrepreneurs are free to move across the regions. The migration hypothesis –
which is framed in discrete time – is based on the idea that entrepreneurs move in another region,
if they can enjoy in the new location a higher indirect utility. Taking into account that
l3 = 1− l1 − l2, the indirect utilities can be expressed as functions of the shares of entrepre-
neurs located in R1 and R2, that is, Vr(l1, l2), r = 1, 2, 3. The following equation is at the centre
of the migration law:
Fr(l1, l2) = lr(1+ gVr(l1, l2)) (12)
where:
Vr(l1, l2) = Vr(l1, l2)− [l1V1(l1, l2)+ l2V2(l1, l2)+ (1− l1 − l2)V3(l1, l2)]
l1V1(l1, l2)+ l2V2(l1, l2)+ (1− l1 − l2)V3(l1, l2) .
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According to (12) – which resembles the replicator dynamics – entrepreneurial migration depends
on the difference between the indirect utility enjoyed in region Rr (see equation 7) and the
weighted average of the indirect utilities in all three regions. The parameter g . 0 represents
the migration speed.
Taking into account the obvious constraint on the shares (i.e., they must belong to the interval
[0, 1]), the change in the spatial distribution of entrepreneurs (from a short-run allocation (l1, l2)
to the next one (Z1(l1, l2), Z2(l1, l2))), can be described by a two-dimensional (2D) piecewise
smooth map Z:R2  R2 deﬁned as follows:
Z:(l1, l2) 7! (Z1(l1, l2), Z2(l1, l2)), (13)
where:
Zr(l1, l2) =
0 if Fr ≤ 0,
Fr if Fr . 0, Fs . 0, Fr + Fs , 1,
Fr
Fr + Fs if Fr . 0, Fs . 0, Fr + Fs ≥ 1,
Fr
1− Fs if Fr . 0, Fs ≤ 0, Fr + Fs , 1,
1 if Fr . 0, Fs ≤ 0, Fr + Fs ≥ 1,
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
with r = 1, s = 2 for Z1(l1, l2) and r = 2, s = 1 for Z2(l1, l2).
The following properties of map Z, which are useful to identify its ﬁxed points (corresponding
to the stationary long-run equilibria of the model), follow from its deﬁnition:
• Property 1. In the (l1, l2)-phase plane, any trajectory of map Z is trapped in a triangle
denoted S, whose sides or borders Ibi, i = 1, 2, 3, are invariant lines of map Z:
Ib1 = {(l1, l2):l2 = 0}, Ib2 = {(l1, l2):l1 = 0}, Ib3 = {(l1, l2):l2 = 1− l1}. (14)
• Property 2. Z is symmetric with respect to the diagonal D = {(l1, l2):l1 = l2}, which is
invariant for Z.8
• Property 3. The vertices of S are core–periphery (CP) ﬁxed points:
CP0:(l1, l2) = (0, 0), CP1:(l1, l2) = (1, 0), CP2:(l1, l2) = (0, 1), (15)
corresponding to full agglomeration of the industrial activity, with all the entrepreneurs located in
only one region.
• Property 4. Any interior ﬁxed point of Z, if it exists, is given by intersection of the curves:
V1 = {(l1, l2):V1(l1, l2) = 0} and V2 = {(l1, l2):V2(l1, l2) = 0}. (16)
An interior equilibrium is characterized by positive shares of entrepreneurs in all regions.
• Property 5. Any border ﬁxed point belonging to Ibi, i = 1, 2, if it exists, is an intersection
point of Vi and Ibi, while any border ﬁxed point belonging to Ib3 is an intersection point of
V1, V2 and Ib3. A border equilibrium is characterized by positive shares of entrepreneurs in
two regions and no entrepreneurs in the third one.
We denote an interior symmetric ﬁxed point by IS: (l1, l2) = (1/3, 1/3) [ D, and an
interior asymmetric ﬁxed point by IA: (l1, l2) = (lIA , lIA) [ D, with lIA = 1/3. The border
symmetric / asymmetric ﬁxed points are denoted by BSi/BAi [ Ibi, i = 1, 2, 3. In case of coex-
isting ﬁxed points of the same type, we use additional labels. Note that a border symmetric equili-
brium is such that, when positive, the two shares are equal to 0.5. For TEX = TU , map Z has only
one border symmetric equilibrium, BS3:(l1, l2) = (1/2, 1/2) [ Ib3.
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Besides the borders Ibi of the triangle S, map Z changes its deﬁnition along ﬁve more borders
(which, depending on the parameters, may or may not intersect the triangle S) that are given in
(11), and the crossing of which determine a change in the network structure.
To investigate how the dynamics of map Z depends on the parameters TEX , TU and L, we ﬁx
in our simulations:
a = b = c = 1
3
, CA = 1, g = 10, E = 10 (17)
and consider ﬁrst the bifurcation structure of the (TEX , L) parameter plane for TU = 0.325, then
of the (TEX , TU ) parameter plane for L = 20.
Figure 3(a) presents a 2D bifurcation diagram in the (TEX , L) parameter plane for
TU = 0.325. It summarizes all possible long-term dynamic behaviour involving map Z. To pro-
duce this 2D bifurcation diagram, we started by using only one initial condition (one initial dis-
tribution of entrepreneurs across space) identifying within the (TEX , L) parameter plane all the
attractors for that given initial condition. After running several simulations, we discovered within
the same (TEX , L) parameter plane other attractors corresponding to different initial conditions.
The coexistence of more than one attractor, that is, a long-run state of the industrial distribution of
the economic activity across space, is a typical result of NEG models that, in our context, is
strengthened by the increase in the number of regions. The presence of different attractors
(each with a different basin of attraction, i.e., the set of initial conditions that converge to that
attractor) may lead to different long-run outcomes depending on the initial distribution of entre-
preneurs. In order to highlight this ﬁnding, Figure 3(a) also indicates these coexisting attractors.
Figure 3. (a) Bifurcation structure of the (TEX , L) parameter plane of map Z at TU = 0.325; (b, c) corre-
sponding one-dimensional bifurcation diagrams of l1 and l2 versus TEX plotted for L = 20 and
0.325 , TEX , 0.46 (see the arrow indicated in (a) in correspondence of that value of L) presenting
only the stable ﬁxed points. All the other parameters are ﬁxed as in (17).
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In particular, the region denoted by CP012 is related to coexisting attracting CP ﬁxed points CP0,
CP1, CP2; the regions BA12 and BS3 to the border ﬁxed points BA1, BA2 and BS3, respectively;
the regions denoted by IA and IA′ (shown in red)9 is related to one (or two coexisting) attracting
interior ﬁxed point(s); the regions denoted by two, three and four (shown in green, light blue and
magenta) are associated with attracting two-, three- and four-cycle, respectively; the region
denoted byM (shown in pink) corresponds either to a so-called Milnor attractor10 on the border
Ib3 or to the M-attracting11 ﬁxed points CP1 and CP2. All regions are separated by boundaries
related to various bifurcations at which the stability properties, the number or the qualitative prop-
erties of attractors (stationary equilibria, of higher periodicity or even chaotic) may change.12 The
one-dimensional (1D) bifurcation diagrams in Figure 3(b) and (c), plotting, respectively, l1 and
l2 versus TEX for L = 20 (see the horizontal arrow in Figure 3(a)) illustrates these coexisting
attractors. It shows only the (stable) ﬁxed points; the grey vertical lines help to visualize the differ-
ent borders (which are also present in Figure 3(a)) crossing which a speciﬁc ﬁxed point loses stab-
ility or disappears (below we discuss the different types of bifurcations induced by the presence of
borders): for example, for TEX , BTCP0 six – locally stable – ﬁxed points coexist, namely three CP
ﬁxed points CP0, CP1, CP2; two asymmetric border ﬁxed points BA1 and BA2; and one border
symmetric ﬁxed point BS3. At TEX = BTCP0, CP0 loses stability via a Border transcritical bifur-
cation; and the number of coexisting ﬁxed point is reduced to ﬁve. Each coexisting ﬁxed point has
Figure 4. Basins of coexisting attracting ﬁxed points of map Z for TU = 0.325, L = 20 and TEX = 0.325
in (a); TEX = 0.35 in (b); TEX = 0.38 in (c); and TEX = 0.45 in (d). The related parameter points are
marked in Figure 3(a) by black circles along the arrowed line drawn at L = 20. The other parameters
are ﬁxed as in (17).
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a speciﬁc basin of attraction. Examples of attractors and their basins are presented in Figures 4, 5
and 8, where attracting, repelling and saddle ﬁxed points are marked by black, white and grey cir-
cles, respectively; the curves Vi, i = 1, 2, given in (16), as well as the border lines Ai , Bi and C
deﬁned in (11) are also shown.
Splitting of the integration area: phase 1
In this subsection, we study the consequences of one of the regions, R3, separating from the other
two, R1and R2. This corresponds to an increase in TEX for a given TU . As an NEG perspective
suggests (e.g., Baldwin et al., 2003), two are the most likely prior scenarios, depending on the
interplay between trade costs, local competition and local demand. In the ﬁrst scenario, the
immobile component of demand, L, is not too large compared with the mobile component, E
(i.e., we set L = 20, which is only twice E = 10); the economy is well integrated and NEG
models typically predict agglomeration of economic activity. In the second scenario, local market
sizes are bigger (we set L = 30, which is three times E = 10) and NEG models suggest an equal
distribution of economic activity.13 In the following, we ﬁrst describe how stability properties of
equilibria and dynamics are affected by changing the relevant parameters; and then we provide an
economic interpretation of the results.
Starting from the ﬁrst scenario, we ﬁx L = 20 and increase TEX beginning from
TEX = TU = 0.325. As shown in Figure 4(a), for such parameter values there are six coexisting
attracting ﬁxed points: the CP equilibria CP0, CP1, and CP2 and the symmetric border equili-
bria BS1, BS2 and BS3. The basins of attraction of the CP equilibria (coloured differently,
respectively in red, blue and green) are relatively small, whereas those of the symmetric border
equilibria (coloured differently, respectively in brown, light blue and Ceylon yellow) are relatively
large. By increasing TEX at ﬁrst CP0 loses stability and the attracting ﬁxed points are reduced to
ﬁve: CP1, CP2, BA1, BA2 and BS3 (Figure 4(b), where TEX = 0.35; note also that BA1 and BA2
are now only symmetric with respect to each other). Increasing further TEX the interior asym-
metric ﬁxed point IA′ (Figure 4(b)) hits the border B (i.e., the intersection of the lines B1 and B2
in Figure 4; see also Figure 3(a)) and gains stability. For a larger TEX also CP1 and CP2 lose
stability and after this sequence of bifurcations map Z has four coexisting attracting ﬁxed points:
BA1, BA2, BS3 and IA′ (Figure 4(c), where TEX = 0.38). Finally, by further increasing TEX ,
also the ﬁxed point BS3 loses its stability merging with the unstable ﬁxed point IA so that
only three attractors are left: the ﬁxed points BA1, BA2 and IA′ (Figure 4(d), where
TEX = 0.45).14
In Figure 4(a) we have chosen parameter values according to the ﬁrst scenario mentioned above:
the interior symmetric ﬁxed point, IS, is unstable and the possible constellations of equilibria prior
the splitting of the integration area involve full or partial agglomeration. Figure 2(a) allows one to
determine the respective trade patterns. The consequences of a soft separation (involving a small
Figure 5. Attractors of map Z for TU = 0.325, L = 30 and TEX = 0.325 in (a); TEX = 0.37 in (b); and
TEX = 0.4 in (c). The other parameters are ﬁxed as in (17).
14 Pasquale Commendatore et al.
SPATIAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
change of TEX ) on industry location can be seen by comparing Figure 4(a) with (b); comparing
Figure 4(a) with (d) reveals the consequences of a hard separation (involving a large change of
TEX ) on industry location; the corresponding trade patterns are found in Figure 2(c):
. First consider the situation before separation where industry is agglomerated in only one region,
that is, one of the CP ﬁxed points CP0, CP1, CP2 in Figure 4(a) prevails. The trade structure is
of the NS7 type, that is, the industrialized core exports to both peripheral regions (whose reci-
procal trade cannot occur since industry is absent). If the core was in the Union (i.e., in CP1 or
CP2), this state may continue after a mild separation (analogous to the soft Brexit scenario), as
shown in Figure 4(b), but notice the smaller basins of attraction of CP1 and CP2. With a sufﬁ-
ciently big shock or if the core was in CP0, that is, located in the leaving region R3, BA1 or BA2
will be the long-run outcome: some ﬁrms leave the industrialized core and move to one of the
other regions, although it is now more distant (because of the higher trade costs), in order to
gain market access. In fact, ﬁrms’ relocation replaces the export link and the trade pattern
changes to the NS4 type; the former core region and the newly industrialized region export
to the remaining peripheral region. Figure 4(d) shows the situation after a substantial separ-
ation (as in a hard Brexit scenario). If the core was located in the Union (in CP1 or CP2)
and in the absence of large shocks (notice the smaller basins of attraction of BA1 and BA2),
the long-run conﬁguration that we have just discussed also applies in this case of a hard sep-
aration. However, if the shocks are large or if the core was located in the leaving region R3,
a hard separation may induce ﬁrms, that leave the industrialized core, to move to both other
regions. The equilibrium will be IA′, and the trade pattern changes to the NS3 type, where
only the two regions in the Union trade with each other. If the core was in region R3, ﬁrm relo-
cation (following market access) substitutes export links (that now involve higher trade costs)
and R3 changes from being the only exporting region to autarkic region. Interestingly, if the
core was in the Union, ﬁrm relocation to the peripheral region within the Union does not
destroy the trade link (that has unchanged trade costs).
. Alternatively, consider a situation before separation where industry is partly agglomerated in
two regions, that is, one of the symmetric border equilibria BS1, BS2 and BS3 prevails
(Figure 4(a)). The trade network is of typeNS4 and involves only exports from the two indus-
trialized towards the peripheral region. If R3 is one of the industrialized region, a soft separ-
ation (Figure 4(b)) induces some R3 ﬁrms to move to the Union’s industrialized region (in
order to gain market access). Thus, the border equilibria BA1 and BA2 become increasingly
asymmetric; in addition, their basin of attraction increases. The same applies in the case of
a hard separation (Figure 4(d)), but now BA1 and BA2 have a reduced basin of attraction.
Instead, if industry was only located within the Union, a soft separation does not induce
ﬁrm relocation and BS3 prevails (Figure 4(b)), though it has a smaller basin of attraction.
In all these cases, trade patterns continue to be of theNS4 type. With large shocks or if indus-
try was only located within the Union, a hard separation (Figure 4(d)) will push the economy
to IA′ and some ﬁrms will move from the two industrialized regions to the periphery. Note
that ﬁrm relocations destroy again export links between the Union and the leaving region
(that involve increased trade costs) and trade networks are of the NS3 type. The incentives
for ﬁrm relocation are worth noticing. If industry was located only within the Union, after
a hard separation some ﬁrms leave the Union in order to locate in R3, where they ﬁnd less
competition. The larger TEX the stronger this incentive becomes. If instead the peripheral
region was in the Union, it attracts industry both from the leaving region R3 because it pro-
vides access to the Union market, and from the Union’s industrialized region, because the
overall market is now smaller (since R3 is more difﬁcult to be reached and has less ﬁrms)
and it is no longer sufﬁcient to sustain agglomeration within the Union.
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To sum up: before the splitting, the Union was well integrated and – corresponding to an
NEG logic – agglomeration in one or two regions was a very likely outcome. With a soft separ-
ation, CP outcomes become less likely, as well as agglomeration in the two regions in the Union.
With a hard separation, the equilibrium IA′, in which industry is located in all three regions,
becomes more likely. Thus, with a hard separation, peripheral regions that did not have industry
can attract ﬁrms. Note that only the two regions in the Union trade, whereas R3 becomes autarkic.
Considering the second scenario before the splitting of the integration area, we assume
L = 30. In this scenario, markets are larger and trade costs are not sufﬁciently low to make the
Union a well-integrated area. NEG models predict dispersion of economic activity. Indeed,
Figure 5(a) illustrates that for TEX = TU = 0.325, the map Z has a unique attractor, which is
the interior symmetric ﬁxed point IS.15 Figure 3(a) shows that when L is sufﬁciently large, the
bifurcation structure becomes quite complicated involving attracting cycles of different periods
(given that the value of g is sufﬁciently large).
Interestingly, separation, that is, increasing TEX , does not destroy the symmetry between the two
regions remaining in the Union, that is, l1 = l2 = lD holds along the long-period attractor. We
exploit this property and focus on the dynamics of the 1Dmap, which is a restriction of mapZ to the
diagonal. This will allow for a neater description of the bifurcation sequence occurring by increasing
TEX . These bifurcations – illustrated in the 1D bifurcation diagram of l1 versus TEX for l1 = l2
and TU , TEX , 0.4 presented in Figure 6 – affect not only industry location but also trade pat-
terns (which can be determined using the lines A, B and C, which correspond, respectively, to the
intersections between the lines A1 and A2, B1 and B2 and the line C and the diagonal line).
As one can see in Figure 6, with a moderate increase in TEX , the interior ﬁxed point IA remains
stable. Such a soft separation increases the incentive for ﬁrms to leave the Union and to move to
region R3 (where they are sheltered from competition). In the situation before separation and for a
moderated increase in TEX , lD lies between the B and C lines; this corresponds to NS10 and we
observe a full trade network.
When IA collides with the border C, a bifurcation occurs,16 after which IA has lost stability
and the economy ﬂuctuates between two points, corresponding to the dark dots (in the printed
version of the paper) or to the yellow dots (in the online version of the paper) close to IA in Figure
5(b), which still belong to the diagonal (Figure 5(b), where TEX = 0.37). That is, the unique
attractor of Z is a cycle of period 2 (or two-cycle). We denote these two points belonging to
Figure 6. One-dimensional (1D) bifurcation diagram l1 versus TEX of a 1D map which is a restriction of
map Z to the diagonal l1 = l2; here L = 30 and TU , TEX , 0.4 (see the horizontal arrow drawn at
L = 30 in Figure 3(a)). All the other parameters are ﬁxed as in (17).
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the two-cycle by lD0 and lD1, with lD0 . lD1. lD0 continues to lie in NS10, whereas lD1 lies
below the C line in the NS7 area: the Union’s regions R1 and R2 trade with each other and R3
exports to them; however, the regions in the Union do not export to R3, since a low lD1 translates
into a high number of ﬁrms in R3 and to an intense competition. Then this cycle of period 2 col-
lides with the border B. This collision does not lead to a qualitative change in the industry location
(i.e., a persistence border collision occurs); trade patterns, however, do change. First, lD0 crosses
the B line and enters the area corresponding to NS8. The regions in the Union R1 and R2 are still
trading with each other. Given the high value of lD0 and the corresponding high (low) number of
ﬁrms in the Union (R3), competition is high in the regions in the Union, but low in R3; exporting
to R3 is attractive for ﬁrms located in regions in the Union, but exporting to the Union is not
attractive for ﬁrms in R3. lD1 continues to involve NS7. Next change in the trade pattern occurs
when lD1 crosses the B line and enters the area corresponding to NS3, implying that region R3 is
autarkic and does not trade at all – given TEX , lD1 is in an intermediate range where there is no
incentive for trade between R3 and regions in the Union. The latter continue to trade with each
other and lD0 remains in the area associated with NS8. Thus, over the cycle of period 2, which
involves a switch between a high and a low number of ﬁrms within the Union, R1and R2 always
trade with each other; they export to R3 only in every other period, that is, in the period in which
the number of ﬁrms (and thus competition) is low in R3. However, the pattern of exports from R3
to the Union’s regions changes markedly. Initially, R3 always exports to the regions in the Union;
then, only in every other period, that is, in periods in which the number of ﬁrms (and thus com-
petition) in the regions in the Union is low (and in R3 is high); and ﬁnally, they never export.
Further increasing TEX leads to a (ﬂip) bifurcation of the two-cycle into an attracting cycle of
period 4, a four-cycle: the economy ﬂuctuates between four points, with now two of them in NS8
and two inNS3. The trade pattern does not change:R1 andR2 tradewith each other; and they export
to R3 only in two of the four periods. As the amplitude of the four-cycle increases, the fourth point
enters in NS7: over the cycle, the regions in the Union always trade with each other, export to R3
in two periods, import from R3 in one period and do not trade with R3 in the last period.
By further increasing TEX the four-cycle collides with the border C leading to a four-cyclic or
four-piece chaotic attractor (the economy starts to experience irregular ﬂuctuations), which then
undergoes a merging bifurcation giving rise to a two-cyclic or two-piece chaotic attractor. This
attractor in its turn also undergoes a merging bifurcation and is transformed into a one-piece chao-
tic attractor (Figure 5(c), where the middle grey points (in the printed version of the paper) or
middle yellow points (in the online version of the paper) on the diagonal show a chaotic attractor
for TEX = 0.4). For most TEX values the (multi- or single piece) chaotic attractor lies in NS3 and
NS8, thus continuing the trade pattern found for lower TEX values. When the amplitude of the
chaotic cycle is sufﬁciently large (TEX is around 0.4), some of the points enter in NS4 (above line
A), which involves no (bilateral) trade between the regions in the Union R1 and R2 and unilateral
exports from the regions in the Union to R3. Thus, that cycle involves NS3,NS4 and NS8, imply-
ing that not only are the export links between the regions in the Union and R3 turned on and off,
but also the bilateral trade links within the Union.17
Splitting of the integration area: phase 2
We now consider the hypothesis that after the splitting of the integration area, the Union inte-
grates even more and R1 and R2 become closer. This corresponds to a reduction in TU for a
given TEX , therefore we assume TEX . TU . As before, we study the dynamic properties of equi-
libria of different periodicity; we then discuss the economic meaning of the results. For reasons of
space, we only consider the ﬁrst prior separation scenario where L = 20.
Below we comment a bifurcation sequence obtained by ﬁxing TEX = 0.45 and decreasing TU .
Appendix A in the supplemental data online discusses in more detail the bifurcation structure of
the (TEX , TU ) parameter plane as reported in Figure 7.
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Figure 8. Coexisting attractors of map Z and their basins for TEX = 0.45, L = 20 and (a) TU = 0.32, (b)
TU = 0.25, (c) TU = 0.186 and (d) TU = 0.05 (see the blue circles in Figure 7(a)). The other parameters
are ﬁxed as in (17).
Figure 7. (a) Bifurcation structure of the (TEX , TU) parameter plane for L = 20 and other parameters
ﬁxed as in (17). The phase portraits associated with parameter points marked by blue circles are
shown in Figure 8. (b–e) One-dimensional diagrams associated with the cross-sections marked by
the arrows in (a) and related to TEX = 0.36 and 0.1 , TU , 0.17 (b); TEX = 0.39 and
0.25 , TU , 0.3 (c); TEX = 0.45 and 0.316 , TU , 0.315 (d); and TEX = 0.45 and 0 , TU , 0.35
(e). In particular, the 1D diagram l1 versus TU related to a 1D restriction of map Z to the border Ib1
(the same dynamics occur for Ib2) is shown in (b, e) and to the border Ib3 in (c); and in (d) 1D diagram
l1 versus TU of map Z.
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Indeed, in our interpretation, we focused on two options: a soft separation (TEX = 0.35) and a
hard separation (TEX = 0.45). The former did not destroy agglomeration patterns and looking at
Figure 7(a) conﬁrms that a deeper integration within the Union may not bring major qualitative
effects. Instead, a hard separation led to dispersion of industrial activity. Further integration within
the Union will transform signiﬁcantly this pattern and we analyse this case in more detail. We
begin with the case shown in Figure 4(d) (where L = 20, TEX = 0.45 and TU = 0.325) and
decrease TU , we discuss the most relevant points of the ensuing sequence of bifurcations (corre-
sponding to the blue circles indicated in Figure 7(a)). At the beginning, this sequence leads to two
new interior attracting ﬁxed points,18 IA′′1 and IA
′′
2 , and to the stability loss of the interior equili-
brium IA′, after which map Z has four attractors: the border equilibria BA1 and BA2 as well as the
interior equilibria IA′′1 and IA
′′
2 (Figure 8(a), where TU = 0.32). After, the attracting (IA′′1 and IA′′2 )
and the saddle interior equilibria (which are visible but not labelled in Figures 4(d) and 8(a)) merge
in pairs and disappear,19 leaving only two stable equilibria, BA1 and BA2 (Figure 8(b), where
TU = 0.25). By further decreasing TU the ﬁxed points BA1 and BA2 undergo a ﬂip bifurcation,
so that attractors of Z are two two-cycles on the borders Ib1 and Ib2 (Figure 8(c), where
TU = 0.186). These two-cycles then collide with the border C, leading to chaos, namely, to
the two-cyclic chaotic attractors on the borders Ib1 and Ib2. At the same time, the ﬁxed points
CP1 and CP2 become attracting. In Figure 8(d), drawn for TU = 0.05, the basins of CP1 and
CP2 are shown in green (dark grey) and dark blue (light grey), respectively.20
Recall (see Figure 4(d)) that a hard separation may lead to two different outcomes. The ﬁrst
possibility is the equilibrium IA′, industry is located in all regions and the trade network struc-
ture is of the NS3 type, that is, bilateral between the regions in the Union, while R3 is autarkic.
Alternatively, a hard separation may lead to BA1 or BA2, where industry is located in R3 and in
only one of the regions in the Union (while the other is left peripheral and without industry) and
trade involves only exports from the two industrialized regions towards the peripheral region
within the Union (NS4).
All panels in Figure 8 start from a hard separation scenario (i.e., TEX = 0.45); the panels
depict an increasing internal integration (TU reduces from 0.32 to 0.05). Notice that in all panels
IA′ has lost stability; thus, the Union’s deeper integration after a hard separation destabilizes the
symmetric location of industry across the Union. Looking at Figure 8(a), two additional results
emerge. First, two new interior ﬁxed points off the diagonal appear that introduce an asymmetry
between the regions in the Union. They are located in area NS2, where only one-way trade occurs
within the Union, from the more to the less industrialized region; R3 remains autarkic (as in IA′).
Second, the basins of attraction of these two equilibria show an intermingled structure, implying
that it is difﬁcult to predict which of the two regions will attract the larger industry share (this
holds in particular for initial conditions close to BS3, in which the regions in the Union are almost
symmetric). These additional new equilibria disappear for an even deeper integration within the
Union.
The two other possible equilibria, BA1 and BA2, persist – ﬁrst as ﬁxed points coexisting with
the new interior ﬁxed points (Figure 8(a)); then as the only ﬁxed points (Figure 8(b)); after they
lose stability and are substituted ﬁrst by cycles of period 2 (Figure 8(c)) and ﬁnally by two-piece
chaotic attractors that coexist with the stable CP1 and CP2 equilibria. Figure 7(e), that focuses on
BA1 (BA2 is symmetric), allows one to analyse these equilibria in more detail (recall that for the
hard separation scenario depicted in Figure 4(d), TEX = 0.45 was assumed).
First, note that deeper integration within the Union will attract ﬁrms from region R3 to the
industrialized region within the Union, its share in industry increases. Second, and most interest-
ingly, the trade pattern changes as well, as can easily be seen from Figure 7(e) (note that the A1 line
is not relevant, since the equilibrium BA1 does not involve industry in R2): initially, for
TU = 0.325 (Figure 4(d)) and TU = 0.32 (Figure 8(a)), l1 was on the right of the B1 line and
below the B2 line, corresponding to NS4 (involving one-way trade from the two industrialized
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regions to the peripheral region within the Union). Reducing TU , the trade pattern changes, once
l1 has crossed the B2 line and enters the areaNS2 (TU = 0.25, Figure 8(b); see also Figure 2(d)): the
one-way trade from the industrialized region in the Union to the peripheral one continues, but R3
is autarkic and does not export anymore to the peripheral region. BA1 and BA2 lose stability and
give rise to cyclical behaviour. In Figure 8(c), the two-cycles do not collide yet with the border C
and the trade pattern does not change: these cycles still involve only trade from R1 to R2 (in BA1)
or from R2 to R1 (in BA2). As TU is further reduced, the period 2 cycles hit the border C. Some of
the points of the ensuing two-piece chaotic attractor lie above the C border, thus in NS8. In these
points, the share of ﬁrms located in R3 is sufﬁciently small that ﬁrms located inR1 ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to export towards R3 as well.
Thus, if one of the regions in the Union is peripheral without industry, it will always import
from the other region in the Union. R3 does not export to the industrialized region in the Union.
With deeper integration in the Union, R3 will stop exporting to the peripheral region in the
Union; it is autarkic for some values of TU , before it starts importing from the industrialized
region in the Union. As shown in Figure 8(d), other possible outcomes are CP1 and CP2,
whose basins of attraction are intermingled, making the prediction of the long-run position
more difﬁcult the closer the initial condition is to CP0. In CP1 and CP2, the core, which is in
the Union, exports to the other two regions.
In summary, deeper integration of the Union after a hard separation involves a loss of stability
for the interior equilibrium IA′. One interesting result is that the reduction in TU may destroy
reciprocal trade within the Union. It also reduces the likelihood of R3 exporting towards the
Union and increases that of non-trading or importing. Other interesting phenomena can emerge
like cyclical or even chaotic behaviour, intermingled basins of attraction and unpredictability of
long-run outcomes concerning the location of industry and the patterns of trade.
CONCLUSIONS
As many empirical studies suggest, Brexit will deeply affect Europe’s economic landscape, in par-
ticular ﬁrm location and trade patterns will change substantially with marked differences between
the regions. Empirical studies treat these two dimensions as rather unrelated, whereas an NEG
perspective suggests that they are intimately related. In this paper, taking inspiration from the
Brexit issue, we ﬁll a gap in the literature exploring the consequences of splitting an integration
area or “Union”. To this purpose, we developed a three-region FE model with linear demand
functions that allows an explicit analysis of changes in trade patterns. Given the notorious analytic
complexity of multiregional NEG models, we primarily present simulation results.
In order to structure our analysis, we differentiated the two situations before separation that are
quintessential from an NEG perspective. The relation between market size and trade costs was
initially such that the Union was a well-integrated economic area. In that case, NEG models pre-
dict (partial or full) agglomeration of economic activity; indeed, we found four agglomeration pat-
terns that are different from an economic point of view. We introduced the splitting of an
integration area as an increase in trade cost towards the exiting region (whereas the trade costs
remain ﬁxed within the Union); and we differentiated between a soft and a hard separation (in
analogy with the two Brexit options), the latter involving a more pronounced increase in trade
costs. Our analysis suggests a reduction of trade between the Union and the leaving region,
and an intensiﬁcation of trade within the Union; in many cases ﬁrms relocate from the exiting
region towards the Union in order to gain market access – in these cases, ﬁrm relocation replaces
an export link. Remarkably, even a region that was peripheral before separation with no industry
may gain industry after separation (being now a region offering access to the Union’s market as
well as offering low local competition). In some cases, we also found ﬁrm relocation from within
the Union to the exiting region, seeking shelter from the intensive competition within the Union.
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Alternatively, the ante separation relation between market size and trade costs was initially
such that the Union was less integrated. An NEG perspective suggests dispersion of economic
activity and a full trade network, which we represented by our second parameter set. In that
case, disintegration does only gradually affect industry location; all regions maintain industry,
though asymmetries between the leaving and the remaining regions will develop (the latter main-
tain their symmetry). With a soft separation, the leaving region actually gains industry (ﬁrms seek-
ing shelter from competition), the full trade network continues to exist. A harder separation
involving a more pronounced increase in trade cost will destabilize the equilibrium and cyclical
or chaotic patterns of industry location emerge. Most interesting, these changes in the number
of ﬁrms and thus in the degree of local competition will also affect trade patterns: bilateral
trade within the Union will persist; (unilateral) trade between the regions in the Union and the
exiting region will only happen with low competition in the destination region (i.e., a low number
of ﬁrms). With very high trade costs, ﬁrms in the exiting region will stop to export.
Finally, we studied the effects of a deeper integration within the Union after one of the regions
has left the Union, starting from a scenario before separation where a well-integrated economic
area displays agglomeration features. We ﬁnd that deeper integration within the Union may actu-
ally reverse the effect of a hard separation on industry location, the peripheral region may again
(partly or fully) lose their industry. Trade patterns, however, will continue to show a rather isolated
position of the exiting region.
Economic disintegration will change trade costs implying corresponding changes in trade pat-
terns and industry location. As a consequence, economic agents’ welfare will change accordingly,
since the range of available commodities will vary together with their price (due to transport costs
and more/less intense local competition), for the mobile factor – entrepreneurs – proﬁt income
changes as well. The overall effect is difﬁcult to ascertain, and we leave this to further research.
However, in many instances we found for the leaving region a reduction in trade, in the number
of ﬁrms and thus in local competition. These factors – taken in isolation – reduce welfare in the
leaving region, an aspect that deserves more attention in any discussions on situations of trade dis-
integration analogous to the Brexit case.
NOTES
1 NUTS = Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics.
2 Our contribution is in the spirit of Oyama (2009), where, in the context of a two-region FE
model with isoelastic demand functions, asymmetric trade costs are introduced. Thus, trading
between regions is more or less costly depending on the direction of trade.
3 That remoteness does not necessarily represent a disadvantage has been stressed also by Beh-
rens, Gaigne, Ottaviano, and Thisse (2006) in a two-country/four-region FEmodel. Their frame-
work of analysis differs from that in this paper in some very relevant respects: (1) ﬁrms cannot
move across all regions (their mobility being allowed only within a country); and (2) trade costs
are sufﬁciently low to allow for bilateral trade between any pair of regions, so that only a unique
trade network structure is possible, that is, the full trade network.
4 The assumption b . d also ensures that the utility function (1) is strictly concave, which is
needed for interior solutions to the utility maximization problem (see also Behrens, 2004, p. 89).
5 These network structures are known in the language of SNA as triads.
6 More in detail: crossing A1, if l1 ≥ ( , )l˜, trade from R2 to R1 it is not allowed (it is allowed);
crossing A2, if l2 ≥ ( , )l˜, trade from R1 to R2 it is not allowed (it is allowed); crossing B1, if
l1 ≥ ( , )l− kl2, trade from R3 to R1 it is not allowed (it is allowed); crossing B2, if
l2 ≥ ( , )l− kl1, trade from R3 to R2 it is not allowed (it is allowed); and crossing C, if
l1 ≤ ( . )1− l− l2, trade from R1 to R3 and from R2 to R3 it is not allowed (it is allowed).
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7 As would be expected, the transition from more to less connected network structures mostly
involves the loss of links connecting the exiting region (R3) with one or both the regions in the
Union (R1 and R2).
8 Property 2 implies that the phase portrait of map Z is symmetric with respect to D, that is, any
invariant setA is either itself symmetric with respect toD or there exists one more invariant setA′
symmetric to A.
9 Figures 3–8 are in colour in the online version and are in greyscales in the printed version.
10 An attractor according to the topological deﬁnition is a closed invariant set with a dense orbit,
which has a neighbourhood, each point of which is attracted to the attractor. An attractor in the
Milnor sense (Milnor, 1985) does not require the existence of such a neighbourhood, but only a
set of points of positive measure, attracted to the attractor.
11 For short, we say that an invariant set isM attractor if it is attracting in the Milnor sense, but
not in a sense of the topological deﬁnition.
12 For example, the boundaries denoted by BT and F correspond to the so-called border-tran-
scritical and fold bifurcations, respectively, which involve a change in the stability of the ﬁxed
points. The type of ﬁxed point is indicated in the subscript.
13 Given the highly abstract nature of NEG models, it is always difﬁcult to put numbers to the
parameters and we do not claim to have calibrated our model. However, Eurostat (2019b) reports
that the percentage with a tertiary education of total employment is about 34% in the EU (ranging
from almost 50% to a bit more than 20%). Thus, our ratios 1/3 (33%) and 1/4 (25%) appear to be
in a reasonable range.
14 This bifurcation sequence can also be understood by looking at Figure 3(a,b) in corre-
spondence of L = 20 and by increasing TEX starting from 0.325. We see that CP0 becomes
unstable when the boundary BTCP0 is crossed, undergoing a border-transcritical bifurcation.
IA′ becomes stable when TEX collides with B (not marked in the Figure), generating a bor-
der collision bifurcation (BCB) entering the region IA′ shown in red. Notice that at the
same bifurcation point, a couple of new interior saddle ﬁxed points are born. Finally,
the ﬁxed point BS3 loses its stability due to a border-transcritical bifurcation when the
boundary BTBS3 is crossed.
15 Border ﬁxed points have already lost their stability via a so-called ﬂip bifurcation, so that on
the borders of the triangle S there are saddle cycles (i.e., cycles stable only along one direction) of
period 2. In Figure 5(a), these unstable period 2 cycles are represented by dots (grey and orange or
blue, respectively) around the corresponding border symmetric ﬁxed point (BS1, BS2 and BS3); in
Figure 5(b), when TEX = 0.37, the two-period cycles around BA1 and BA2 are replaced by two-
piece 1D chaotic attractors on Ib1 and Ib2; and in Figure 5(c), when TEX = 0.4, by a one-piece 1D
chaotic attractors on Ib1 and Ib2.
16 Speciﬁcally, a ﬂip BCB takes place.
17 When TEX is increased even further, the attractor on the diagonal disappears (more precisely,
it is transformed into a chaotic repellor) due to a contact with the border Ib3 (when the parameter
point enters the pink region M in Figure 3(a)) after which almost all the initial points of S are
attracted to anM attractor belonging to Ib3 (a 1D chaotic attractor whose points are characterized
by no industry in R3). This attractor eventually disappears due to a contact with the ﬁxed points
CP1 and CP2, so that they becomeM attracting. All industry is located in one region of the Union,
R1or R2.
18 More speciﬁcally, considering the range 0.316 , TU , 0.325 represented in Figure 7(d), a
fold BCB gives rise to two couples of interior ﬁxed points (see the label BCAIA′′ ) leading to two
new interior attracting ﬁxed points, IA′′1 and IA
′′
2 , and two saddles; these saddles quite soon
merge with the ﬁxed point IA′ and this ﬁxed point loses stability, that is, a reverse pitchfork bifur-
cation occurs. A maximum of four stable ﬁxed points exists in this range.
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19 This occurs via a reverse fold bifurcation (when the curve FIA′′ is crossed, see also the label FIA′′
in Figure 7(d)).
20 More speciﬁcally, they become M attracting (see note 7 above). This is because the ﬂat
branches of the functions deﬁning map Z ‘enter’ the triangle S. Evolution of the attractors on
the borders Ib1 and Ib2 can be clariﬁed by means of the 1D bifurcation diagram l1 versus TU
shown in Figure 7(e) (recall that due to the symmetry of the map the same dynamics is observed
on the border Ib2). In this diagram one can see that a contact of the two-cycle with the border C
indeed leads to the two-cyclic chaotic attractor.
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